TUvalues: Tools for Calculating Allocations in Game Theory using Exact and
Approximated Methods
The main objective of cooperative Transferable-Utility games (TU-games)
is to allocate a good among the agents involved. The package implements major
solution concepts including the Shapley value, Banzhaf value, and egalitarian
rules, alongside their extensions for structured games: the Owen value and
Banzhaf-Owen value for games with a priori unions, and the Myerson value for
communication games on networks. To address the inherent exponential
computational complexity of exact evaluation, the package offers both exact
algorithms and sampling-based approximation methods, enabling the analysis of
large-scale games. The characteristic function can be supplied as a vector or
as an R function, so that coalition values are evaluated only when required.
Additionally, it supports core set-based solutions, allowing computation of
the vertices and the centroid of the core and checking whether an allocation
belongs to it.
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[cre, aut],
Juan Carlos Gonçalves